Is Foreign Aid a Scam? Two Development Insiders Agree It's Broken, Differ on Scale and Fixes
Views on foreign aid have rarely been this polarized — whether American taxpayers should fund health, education, governance, agriculture, and conservation programs aimed at uplifting the poorest of the poor, and, in conservation's case, protecting planetary resources for every...
Views on foreign aid have rarely been this polarized — whether American taxpayers should fund health, education, governance, agriculture, and conservation programs aimed at uplifting the poorest of the poor, and, in conservation's case, protecting planetary resources for everyone. This conversation doesn't resolve that debate, but it grounds it: a development professional's account of four decades in the field — a World Bank rangeland project vilified in Graham Hancock's "Lords of Poverty", a Mali irrigation project that worked because farmers wanted it, an NGO program shut down after seven years of success "because we can," and a $20M initiative that began as an 8-country program, was already whittled down to 4, and then died outright when a D.C. bureaucrat used a (purposeful) mix-up with Kazakhstan as the reason to deny it moving forward. The verdict: appropriateness and feasibility, not funding levels or good intentions, determine whether aid succeeds. This of course considers whether the governance framework is enabling to begin with.
Michael and guest Emily Brearley — a former World Bank economist and author of Aid Inferno — agree on the goal: aid needs a real social contract to work at all. Where they differ is on scale and on the fix, especially whether big-vision programming at scale is worth attempting in the first place. Both agree the pre-DOGE aid model hasn't shown evidence of working, and that whatever comes next has to change. This is Segment 1 of 3: what's gone wrong, and what could come next.
Michael's own arguments are laid out at greater length in Redeeming REDD and Climate Mitigation in the Land Sector of the Global South: Making it Work for People and Planet. Emily's case is made in Aid Inferno.
Segment 1 of 3. Coming next: Segment 2 — Can Aid Scale? — weighing the small, proven Mali project against the big, negotiated institutional model. Then Segment 3 — Can Aid Be Fixed, or Should It Be Scrapped? — two competing paths to a possible new social contract.
00:00 The Central Rangelands project and Graham Hancock's critique 01:44 Mali: motor pumps, ownership, and why farmers made it work 02:37 Seven successful years, shut down "because we can" 03:08 Founding Innovative Resources Management 03:39 From 8 countries to 4 to zero — the "Kazakhstan" excuse that killed it for good 04:09 Verdict: money isn't the problem — appropriateness is 04:49 Introducing Emily Brearley, former World Bank economist and author of Aid Inferno
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